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Abstract
The initial phase of the deployment of Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) has begun
and many research challenges still need to be addressed. Location privacy continues to be
in the top of these challenges. Indeed, both of academia and industry agreed to apply the
pseudonym changing approach as a solution to protect the location privacy of VANETs’
users. However, due to the pseudonyms linking attack, a simple changing of pseudonym
shown to be inefficient to provide the required protection. For this reason, many pseudonym
changing strategies have been suggested to provide an effective pseudonym changing. Un-
fortunately, the development of an effective pseudonym changing strategy for VANETs is
still an open issue. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey and classification of
pseudonym changing strategies. We then discuss and compare them with respect to some
relevant criteria. Finally, we highlight some current researches, and open issues and give
some future directions.
Keywords:VANETs, security, location privacy, pseudonym changing.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
4.
00
67
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
 A
pr
 20
17
ar
X
iv
:
so
m
e
ot
h
er
te
x
t
go
es
h
er
e
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) have attracted a lot of interest
from both the research community and the automotive industry due to their a huge impact on
the future transportation systems (ITS) [1]. This technology is primarily developed to enhance
road safety and provide traffic efficiency. VANETs allow vehicles not only to communicate
between them (V2V), but also with an installed infrastructure (V2I), which enables a variety
of interesting applications. These applications can be ranging from safety-related applications,
such as collision warning and emergency reporting to non-safety applications like infotainment
[2]. Safety-related applications are usually based on beaconing i.e. the process of periodically
broadcasting safety messages. These latter are called Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs)
in Europe and Basic Safety Messages (BSM) in US [3] and they are broadcasted over the DSRC
control channel (CCH) with a high frequency ranging from 1 to 10 Hz as suggested by standard-
ization bodies such as IEEE, ETSI, and SAE [4]. Safety messages include sensitive information
about the current state of vehicles such as their identifiers, positions, and velocities. The encryp-
tion of these messages is not recommended since many VANETs’ participants are concerned by
them [5]. In addition, decrypting safety messages can add a latency in the processing of them,
which may not meet with real-time requirements of safety-related applications [6]. However,
due to security threats such as false data injections, disseminated messages modifications, and
reply attacks, safety messages must be authenticated.
The aim of safety messages is to make vehicles aware about their surrounding environment,
which significantly improves road safety. For example, using these messages, vehicles can expect
or detect dangerous situations that can cause serious damages on VANETs such as collisions
and accidents. As a result, vehicles can then make decisions to prevent such bad consequences.
However, although, safety messages are beneficial for road safety, they may also be exploited by
adversaries for unauthorized location tracking of vehicles [7]. Indeed, due to the nature of the
wireless medium, a passive adversary can easily eavesdrop all the broadcasted safety messages
within its region of interest. It can then collect these safety messages and determine the locations
visited by vehicles over time. The location tracking of vehicles could violate drivers privacy since
one vehicle is usually associated only to one driver [8]. Therefore, knowing vehicle’s position
can lead to disclosure critical information about driver’s life. For example, having information
about of the frequency of driver’s visits to a given hospital may raise doubts of the employer
about the driver’s health [9]. Furthermore, the driver’s life can be put at risk if the adversary
is a criminal. Protecting the location privacy is thus crucial because the lack of the protection
may disturb the deployment of VANET technology.
Several privacy requirements for VANETs are identified in the literature (discussed in Sub-
section 2.1). The anonymity is one of the main privacy requirements. It ensures that safety
messages are authenticated without attaching the real senders’ identifiers. The anonymity is
however contracted with the accountability security service, which aims to ensure that the au-
thorities are always able to identify vehicles in case of a misbehaving behavior. Therefore,
the privacy in VANETs must be conditional, where vehicles are anonymous to all VANETs’
participants except the authorities, which must still track them.
In order to meet these requirements, many anonymous authentication schemes have been
proposed. These schemes can generally be divided into three categories [10]: (i) the group-
signature-based schemes (e.g. [11]), (ii) pseudonymous authentication schemes (e.g. [12]), and
finally (iii) hybrid schemes (e.g. [13]). However, both of academia and industry have adopted a
pseudonymous authentication scheme to be implemented in the future deployment of VANETs
[14]. Indeed, the current security standards IEEE 1609.2 standard [15] and ETSI 102941-v1.1.1
[16] are based on a traditional public infrastructure (PKI). The pseudonyms represent a set
of certified public keys (anonymous certificates) stored in the vehicle’s On-Board Unit (OBU)
[12]. Instead of using one identifier (public key) all the time, a vehicle periodically changes
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its pseudonym to mitigate the tracking of its positions. Moreover, the change of pseudonym
should be accompanied by the change of all the identifiers of communication stack layers such
as the MAC and the IP addresses [17]. The pseudonym can then be seen as a fictive vehicle’s
identifier, where only the authorities can resolve it i.e. finding the relationship between a
given pseudonym and the corresponding real identifier of the vehicle. The location privacy
protection using the pseudonym changing approach mainly depends on two factors: (i) the
frequency of pseudonyms changing i.e. the higher frequency of pseudonyms changing is, the
more level of location privacy protection is. However, knowing that the pseudonyms are the
identifiers that are used in the inter-vehiculaire communications, the changing of pseudonyms
with a high frequency will certainly has negative effects on the communication performances.
Indeed, Schoch and al. [18] demonstrated that a high level of packet loss is engendered when
incorporating a geographic routing protocol with the changing of pseudonyms (frequency less
than 30s), and (ii) the unlinkability i.e. two pseudonyms belongs to the same vehicle should not
be linked to each other.
Unfortunately, several conducted works to study the efficiency of the pseudonym changing
approach (discussed in Subsection 2.2) demonstrated that a simple changing of pseudonym is
ineffective to provide the required level of location privacy protection for the VANETs’ users.
This is due to the pseudonyms linking attack. Indeed, there exist two types of pseudonyms
linking attack (presented in Subsection 2.3): the syntactic linking and the semantic linking.
Many pseudonym changing strategies have been suggested to provide protection against this
attack. The aim of a pseudonym changing strategy is to determine where, when, and how
vehicles should change their pseudonyms to provide the unlinkablity between them. However,
although, the variety of the existing the pseudonym changing strategies, there is no strategy
suggested by standardization bodies to be applied until now [19].
Several surveys have been conducted on the security and privacy in VANETs (e.g [20, 21,
22, 23, 24]). Petit et al. [21] presented a detailed survey on existing pseudonymous schemes in
VANETs. The authors compared and classified the different existing solutions, and identified
some open challenges among them the lack of an effective pseudonym changing strategy and
the absence of a comparison between existing strategies. To complement these efforts, this
paper presents a comprehensive survey of existing pseudonym changing strategies for VANETs.
The paper carefully analyzes these strategies to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each
strategy. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose such survey. We hope
that this survey will help to take a decision of which strategy should be applied in the future
deployment of VANETs and potentially propose new strategies.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We survey and elaborate a taxonomy of pseudonyms changing strategies for VANETs.
• We discuss, analyze, and compare the presented strategies.
• We highlight some open challenges on the pseudonym changing strategy issue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some necessary
background information. A taxonomy pseudonym changing strategies is presented in Section
3. In Sections 4, we discuss, classify and compare the presented strategies. Some research
challenges are given in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes this survey.
2 Background
The purpose of this section is to give the reader the necessary background information to
understand the research presented in this paper.
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2.1 Privacy requirements
The privacy is one of the important human rights that should be protected [25]. However, the
current technological development has threaten this right and reduced the control of users on
their personnel information [26]. For this reason, researchers have suggested a set of require-
ments to ensure the privacy protection of these technologies’ users. Indeed, the following privacy
requirements have been identified for VANETs [27]:
• Minimum disclosure: the amount of information revealed by a user should be limited
to the necessary information to ensure VANETs’ functionalities.
• Anonymity: messages sent by a vehicle should be anonymous within a set of potential
vehicles. This requirement contradicts the accountability, which is one of the main security
requirement for VANETs. The accountability states that the authorities should be able
to identify the origin of any sent message. For this reason, the anonymity should be
conditional in VANETs.
• Unlinkability: two messages related to the same vehicle cannot be linked for longtime.
• Perfect forward privacy: resolution or revocation of one credential should not affect
the unlinkability of any of the vehicle’s other credentials.
2.2 Studies on the efficiency of the pseudonym changing approach
Several studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of pseudonym changes. In the following,
we discuss some existing studies. Buttya´n et al. [28] studied the impact of the adversary power
on the effectiveness of pseudonym changing approach. They found that if the adversary only
controls the half of the road intersections then the probability of success tracking reaches 90%.
Wiedersheim et al. [29] used an advanced tracking method called Multi-Hypothesis-Tracking
(MHT) [30] incorporating with the Kalman filter [31] to track vehicles. They claimed that a
global passive adversary can effectively track the vehicles with accuracy of almost 100%. In
[7], Emara et al. showed that the tracking can effectively be done even using a simple tracking
method, called the Nearest Neighbor Probabilistic Data Association (NNPDA) [32]. In a recent
study presented in Black Hat conference [33], Petit et al. demonstrated through real-world
experiments using ITS hardware that the location tracking of vehicles can easily be performed.
Indeed, they found that the tracking success is achieved 40% using only two sniffing stations,
and 90% if 8 sniffing stations are used.
The results of all these studies confirmed that vehicle’s positions can be tracked even with
the frequently changing of pseudonyms. This can be done using the pseudonyms linking attack.
This attack is presented in the next subsection.
2.3 Pseudonyms linking attack
Two types of pseudonyms linking attack have been identified by Buttya´n et al. in [34]. These
types are described in the following subsections.
2.3.1 Syntactic linking
Figure 1 illustrates the syntactic linking of pseudonyms case. If during ∆t only one vehicle (B)
changes its pseudonym (from B1 to B2 ) among the three vehicles that running on the road, the
adversary can then easily link the pseudonyms B1 and B2. The protection against this type of
attack can be performed through using a mechanism to synchronize the changes of pseudonyms
between vehicles.
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Figure 1: The syntactic linking of pseudonyms
2.3.2 Semantic linking
Figure 2 illustrates the semantic linking of pseudonyms. This type of attack is more powerful
than the syntactic linking of pseudonyms because the adversary relies on the information in-
cluded in safety messages to link the pseudonyms. For example, the adversary can predict the
next position of the vehicle using a tracking method like [29][7]. Then, based on this prediction
the adversary can link the pseudonyms B1 and B2 even if the three vehicles, illustrated in
Figure 2, change their pseudonyms in the same time. The protection against this type of attack
can only be done by preventing the adversary to get access to safety messages for some periods
of time.
Figure 2: The semantic linking of pseudonyms
2.4 Privacy metrics
A variety of metrics have been proposed to evaluate the level of the location privacy protection
achieved by a pseudonym changing strategy. In [35], Wagner et al. reviewed the different
metrics used in this context. In the following, we present the most used metrics:
• Anonymity set size: the anonymity set, denoted by AS, is defined as the set of vehicles
that are indistinguishable from the target with the set including the target itself [36].
The size of the anonymity set |AS | is then the number of vehicles that the anonymity
set includes. The size of the anonymity set represents the level of the location privacy
protection achieved, which should be grater than 1 in this case. However, this metric
assumes that all vehicles of the anonymity set are equally likely to be the target. Therefore,
as discussed in [37], the knowledge of the adversary that makes some vehicles more likely
to be the target than the others cannot be described using this metric. For this reason,
the entropy is suggested as a metric [37].
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• Entropy of the anonymity set size: the entropy is a concept coming from the in-
formation theory that expresses the uncertainty in a random variable. In contrast to the
anonymity set size, the entropy of the anonymity set, denoted by Hp, allows expressing the
adversary’s knowledge about each vehicle of the anonymity set. The entropy is calculated
using the following formula:
Hp = −
|AS |∑
i=1
pi log2 pi .
Where pi refers to the probability of a vehicle i being the target. If all vehicles have a
same probability to be the target i.e. the probabilities are uniformly distributed over the
anonymity set, the entropy then achieves its maximum value, denoted by Hmax, which is
given by:
∀i : pi = 1| AS | ,Hpmax = −
|AS |∑
i=1
pi log2 pi = log2 | AS | .
If we assume that the adversary has initially no knowledge about the vehicles of the
anonymity set. Then, the information that can be obtained the adversary can be measured
using the following difference: Hmax - Hp. [38] proposed the degree of anonymity d, which
a normalized value of (Hmax - Hp) in the range [0,1]. The degree of anonymity is then
computed using the following formula:
d = 1 − Hmax − H
Hmax
=
H
Hmax
• Adversary’s success rate: the adversary’s success rate is generally defined according to
the proposed pseudonym changing strategy. It represents the ratio of vehicles that could
still be tracked by the adversary after executing the strategy.
• Maximum tracking time: the maximum tracking time measures the maximum duration
of time that the adversary stills linking the pseudonyms of vehicles.
• Statistics on pseudonym changes: this can include information about changed pseudonyms
such as their total number and the number of successful changes.
2.5 Adversary model
Due to the complexity of the VANET system, different attacks can be performed by different
types of adversary. The potential types of adversary in VANETs have been extensively studied
in the literature. [39] identified the following types of adversary:
• Global vs. Local: compared to a local adversary, a global adversary has an overall
coverage of the VANET. It can then eavesdrop every message diffused by any vehicle.
• Active vs. Passive: an active adversary is more dangerous than a passive adversary
since it can alter or inject messages, while a passive attacker can only eavesdrop messages.
• Internal vs. External: an internal adversary is an authenticated member of the
VANETs system. An external adversary is considered as an intruder.
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A location privacy adversary model aims to track the target vehicle by eavesdropping all
communications of any vehicle within a region of interest. For this reason, researchers often
consider the global passive adversary to study the location privacy in VANETs. [40] pointed
out that due to the cost of eavesdropping the global coverage, is hard to be achieved. In [33],
the authors defined more realistic adversary called mid-sized adversary. The coverage of this
adversary is larger than a local passive adversary and less than a global passive adversary. In
other words, it can cover a limited number of areas without getting the full coverage. The
authors also suggested to take into the account the tracking period to evaluate the power of this
adversary. The tracking period represents time that the adversary try to link the pseudonyms
of vehicles. Based on this latter parameter, the authors distinguished tree tracking types:
• Short-term tracking: the adversary tries to track vehicles only for a couple of seconds.
• Mid-term tracking: the adversary tries to track vehicles for a single trip, which can go
from a couple of minutes to a couple of hours.
• Long-term tracking: in this case the period in which the adversary tries to track vehicles
is extended to several days.
Figure 3: Pseudonym changing strategies taxonomy.
3 Pseudonym changing strategies: a taxonomy
The main purpose of a pseudonym changing strategy is to determine where and when a vehicle
should change its pseudonyms to achieve the unlinkablity between them. Many pseudonym
changing strategies have been proposed to provide protection against the pseudonyms linking
attack. In Figure 3, we propose a taxonomy of existing pseudonym changing strategies for
vehicular ad-hoc networks. We divide these strategies into two categories: (i) mix-zone-based
strategies, and (ii) mix-context based strategies.
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3.1 Mix-Zone-based strategies
In mix-zone-based strategies, vehicles change their pseudonyms on predefined road areas, called
mix zones. The concept is first proposed by Beresford and Stajano in the context of pervasive
computing [41]. The authors in [28], studied the location privacy protection against a limited
adversary model that can only control a limited number of places of the vehicular area. They
then considered the regions that are not controlled by the adversary as mix zones.
Figure 4: Mix-zone concept
Figure 4 illustrates a mix zone installed at a road intersection. If a vehicle enters the zone
from the port 1, changes its pseudonym inside the mix zone, and after that exits it from one
the port 2,3,4 the adversary could confused due of this.
The first implementation of the mix-zone concept proposed by Freudiger et al in [42]. The
authors proposed a protocol for creating CMIX (Cryptographic MIX) zones. A CMIX zone is a
road area where safety messages are encrypted. The authors suggested placing these mix zones
at road intersections. Vehicles change their pseudonyms inside a CMIX zone and use a shared
key distributed by a RSU to encrypt their safety messages. Each intersection is equipped by a
RSU, which periodically broadcasts a notification to inform vehicles the existence of a CMIX
zone. When a vehicle receives such notification, it sends a message to the RSU to request the
encryption key. As soon as the RSU receives the request, it provides the encryption key to the
vehicle and waits for an acknowledgment from it. If the vehicle well received the key, it sends
the acknowledgment to the RSU, and starts the encryption of its safety messages using this key.
It must also change its pseudonym within the CMIX zone. The authors also pointed out the
problem of vehicles entering to a CMIX zone that did not receive a notification for the RSU yet.
Indeed, these vehicles are not able to decrypt the safety messages coming from the CMIX zone.
For this reason, they proposed that the encryption key should be forwarded from the vehicles
that are already inside the CMIX zone to the vehicles entering to it.
Besides of this, several works have be been conducted to propose the optimal deployment
of CMIX zones over the road’s intersections (e.g. [43][44][45][46][47]). In these works some
optimization techniques such as the multi-objective optimization, heuristics, and the game-
theoretic approach are used to find the optimal deployment of CMIX zones to achieve high
levels of location privacy protection.
Lu et al. [48, 49] suggested to change the pseudonym at Social Spots, which are simply public
places areas such as signalized intersections, when traffic light turns to red, and parking lots
near a shopping mall. Two simple pseudonyms changing strategies are then proposed in these
papers: (i) all vehicles stopped in front of the red traffic light at signalized intersections, change
their pseudonym together when the traffic light turns green, and (ii) each vehicle stopped at a
free parking lot near a shopping mall, changes its pseudonym just before leaving the parking
lot.
8
ar
X
iv
:
so
m
e
ot
h
er
te
x
t
go
es
h
er
e
Boualouache and Moussaoui (a) [50, 51] proposed a strategy adapted for the urban envi-
ronment. This strategy is based on the creation silent mix zones at signalized intersections
only while the traffic light is red. The authors suggested that vehicles can either change or
exchange their pseudonyms inside these silent mix zones. The signalized intersection is then
equipped by a RSU, which starts broadcasting notifications only if the traffic light turns to
red. Each notification includes the position of the beginning of the silent mix zone, denoted
by Psm. If a vehicle receives such notification, it compares its position with Psm. If a vehi-
cle finds itself inside the silent mix zone, it immediately stops broadcasting safety messages.
Two techniques can be used inside the silent mix zone. Indeed, the vehicle can either simply
change its pseudonym or exchange it with other vehicle. The exchange of pseudonyms is per-
formed using the swapping protocol, where each time, the RSU chooses randomly two vehicles
to exchange their pseudonyms and informs the CA about each performed exchange to keep the
accountability. All the messages used in the exchanging are encrypted.
Boualouache et al. [52] proposed a pseudonym changing strategy based on a designed
roadside infrastructure, called the Vehicular Location Privacy Zone (VLPZ). The design of
a VLPZ is similar to existing roadside infrastructures such as gas stations, electric vehicles
charging stations, and toll booths. A basic VLPZ consists of two points: (i) one entry point
called the router, and (ii) one exit point called the aggregator ; and a limited number of lanes l
where l > 1. Vehicles arrive to a VLPZ, one after another, on one lane. When a vehicle reaches
the router, it stops broadcasting safety messages and heads for a VLPZ’s lane randomly and
privately assigned by the router. Vehicles can reside inside a VLPZ for a random period of time.
For example, if a VLPZ is deployed in a gaz station, this period is the time taken by the driver
to fill the fuel tank of its vehicle. Vehicles must change their pseudonyms before they exit the
VLPZ through the aggregator. However, the exit order is different from the entering order since
the residency periods of vehicles are random.
3.2 Mix-Context-based Strategies
In contrast to mix-zone-based strategies, in mix-context-based strategies, each vehicle indepen-
dently determines where and when to change its pseudonym. This concept is first introduced in
the context of wireless networks in general [53]. The concept is called a user-centric approach
and suggests that mobiles users should be able to control their location privacy protection. [54]
adapted this concept for the VANETs. Indeed, the authors defined the mix-context as any
situation or opportunity helps the vehicle to increase its location privacy protection using the
changing of pseudonym mechanism. Precisely, the mix-context is defined as any situation or
opportunity to synchronize the pseudonyms changes between vehicles. The vehicle then changes
its pseudonym only if the mix-context is found.
Figure 5 illustrates a general state diagram of a mix-context based strategy. The vehicle is
initially equipped by a set of pseudonyms. Each pseudonym is used for a limited period of time,
which is called the stable time. The stable time should be greater than a certain threshold to
not affect safety-related applications [18] as discussed in the introduction. After the expiration
of the stable time, the vehicle then moves to ready to change state. It initializes a timer and
starts looking for a mix context. If the mix context is found, the vehicle immediately changes
its pseudonym. However, if the mix-context is not found after a certain threshold of time
determined by the system designer, the vehicle is forced to change its pseudonym.
Gerlach and Gu¨ttler [54] considered the direction and the number of vehicles in the commu-
nication range as mix context parameters. The vehicle changes its pseudonym only if it detects
k neighboring vehicles at a distance smaller than the minimal distance and have a similar direc-
tion with it within its communication range. The minimal distance is considered equal to 4.25
meters in their simulations. Song et al. [56, 57] proposed the Density-based Location Privacy
(DLP) strategy, which is based on a zone known as K-density zone to change the pseudonym.
The vehicle changes its pseudonym within the K-density zone, if (k-1) neighbors are found over
9
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Figure 5: A general state diagram of a mix-context-based strategy [54] [55].
the communication range.
Liao and Li [55] proposed an improvement of [54]. The authors proposed to add the speed,
the distance between vehicles and the road segment in the mix context. They also proposed to
insert a bit (flag) in the safety message, which indicates the willingness of a vehicle to change
its pseudonym. The vehicle then changes its pseudonym if it found k neighboring vehicles have
similar status to itself and whose flags equal to 1. The purpose of these improvements is to
increase the probability that many vehicles simultaneously change their pseudonyms.
Pan and Li [58, 59] proposed Cooperative Pseudonym strategy (CPN). They first assume
that the safety messages broadcasts are synchronized to be sent at the same time slot using
GPS clocks. A vehicle v changes its pseudonym if it found at least k neighboring vehicles ready
to change their pseudonyms or one of its neighboring vehicles has at least k neighboring vehicles
ready to change their pseudonyms. In other words, on the one hand, the vehicle v cooperates
with its neighbors if one of them has k or more neighbors ready to change their pseudonyms.
On the other hand, if v has k neighbors ready to change their pseudonyms, they will cooperate
with it, if none of them has k neighbors ready to change their pseudonyms.
Ying and Makrakis [60] proposed a pseudonym changing strategy based on a Candidate-
location-list, called PCC. As [59], the authors assumed that the safety messages are synchronized
to be broadcasted at the same time slot and in a multi-hops way. In addition, vehicles can reuse
their pseudonyms more than one time. The authors proposed to insert new five fields into each
broadcasted safety message: (i) sa1 : the address of the vehicle that generates the message, (ii)
sa2 : the address of the vehicle that rebroadcasts the message, (iii) hop: the number of hops
between the source and the receiver, which is initially set at 0 and incremented each time the
safety message is rebroadcasted by a vehicle, (iv) MaxLiveTime: the lifetime of the message,
and finally (v) ChStot : that indicates on which slot the vehicle should change its pseudonym.
These additional information aim to allow a vehicle to track the time slots on which other
vehicles change their pseudonyms. Each vehicle stores some information about the received
10
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safety messages for a limited storage time (MaxLiveTime) in a Candidate Location List (CCL).
Each entry of the CCL contains the following fields: ID, hop, ChSlot, MaxLiveTime, Position,
and Timestamp, where ID is the current pseudonym used by the vehicle, Position is the current
position of the vehicle, and Timestamp is the time when the entry is inserted ou updated in
the CCL. If a vehicle receives a safety message, it first checks if the value of hope is not greater
than MaxHopThreshold. If this is the case, the vehicle then inserts an entry for this message in
its CCL, increases the value of hop by 1, and rebroadcasts it again. In addition, if the vehicle
receives a safety message with a value of hope less than the value of hope saved in its CCL, it
then updates the corresponding entry.
The PCC strategy is then executed as follows. The vehicle initially sets the value ChStot
to -1 and based on the prediction on the movement of vehicles, it periodically calculates the
distance between itself and each vehicle saved in its CCL. It then chooses at least k vehicles
that have minimum distances from it. hmax is defined as the maximum value of hop of these
vehicles. If a vehicle’s pseudonym expires at time slot i, the vehicle should then broadcast a
safety message with ChSlot equals to i+1 at time slot i-hmax. If a vehicle receives such message,
it rebroadcasts it, changes its pseudonym at time slot i+1. However, if during the lifetime of the
current pseudonym, the vehicle receives several safety messages with different values of ChSlot,
it changes its pseudonym at the minimum value of ChSlot and does not change it again until
its expiration.
Sampigethaya and al. [36, 61] adopted the use of the random silence periods concept [62].
The authors proposed that vehicles turn their radio transmitters off (stop sending safety mes-
sages) for a limited random period of time each time when are going to change their pseudonyms.
The aim of this random silence period is to try to confuse the adversary. Indeed, If at same time
two vehicles at least turn their radio transmitters off for a random period of time and change
their pseudonyms during this period , the adversary could then be confused [63][64].
Buttya´n et al. [34] proposed a simple pseudonym changing strategy, called SLOW (Silence
at low speeds). This strategy uses the radio silence concept. Indeed, the authors suggested that
vehicles turn their radio transmissions off when their speeds are less than 30Km/h and change
their pseudonyms during the radio silence. Ying et al. [66, 67] proposed a pseudonym changing
strategy, called DMLP (Dynamic Mix-Zone for Location Privacy in Vehicular Networks). This
strategy aims to dynamically create CMIX zones i.e. the vehicle establishes a CMIX zone
where and when it is needed. The authors introduced new entities in the VANET system
architecture, called Control Servers (CSs). CSs are responsible to control and coordinate the
change of pseudonyms processes between vehicles. Each CS is connected to a set of RSUs that
cover a certain area. Each pseudonym is used by a vehicle for ∆t. If a vehicle v wants to
create a DMLP, it should send a Request New Pseudonym (RNP) message to CS close to the
expiration of its current pseudonym. The vehicle v broadcasts the last message with the old
pseudonym at t and waits for the period of time (τ) to change its pseudonym before begins
broadcasting safety messages. τ is the period of time that takes the vehicle to create a dynamic
mix zone. The dynamic mix zone is created as follows. If the CS receives a RNP message, it first
determines the length (l) of the zone that will be created. After that it sends a COMMAND
message to the relevant RSUs that exist in the zone. As soon as a RSU, receives such message, it
immediately rebroadcasts it to the vehicles within its communication range. If a vehicle receives
a COMMAND message, it starts encrypting safety messages, changes its pseudonym and sends
a RNP message to the CS. The concerned vehicles are still encrypting safety messages for TEP,
which is TEP ≤ ∆t.
Wasef and Shen [68] suggested random encryption periods (REPs). When the vehicle decides
to change its pseudonym, it sends a request to its neighbors for starting a REP. During a REP,
the safety messages are encrypted using a shared group key. A REP is considered successful if at
least one of the neighbors also changes its pseudonym and its speed or its direction. Eckhoff et
al. [69, 8] suggested equipping vehicles with a limited number of pseudonyms. Each pseudonym
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is used for a specific short period of week. The authors pointed out that pseudonyms can be
linked, because always a same pseudonym is used during a same period. For this reason, they
proposed using the exchanging of pseudonyms technique, which is inspired by [53]. The vehicles
can then exchange their pseudonyms through encrypted channels.
Weerasinghe et al. [70] proposed a strategy called SPCP (pseudonym changing protocol).
In SPCP, vehicles are self-organized as groups. Each group is managed by a group leader, which
randomly decides when to change the pseudonyms of group’s members. All members are then
informed about the time when the pseudonym changing process will occur. During this process
each member the group identifier as a temporal pseudonym and each vehicle quits the group
should also changes its pseudonym.
Boualouache and Moussaoui (b) [71] proposed a strategy, called TAPCS (Traffic-Aware
Pseudonym Changing Strategy). In TAPCS, vehicles continuously monitor the road traffic’s
status to find a good place where the silent mix zone (SM) can be created. This strategy is
mainly based on a privacy-preserving traffic congestion detection protocol that acts as a trigger
of the strategy and consists of fives phases. (i) Traffic Congestion Detection Phase: In this
phase, every vehicle continuously monitors its speed. If its speed is still lower than a certain
threshold for a certain period of time, the vehicle reports a potential traffic congestion and
broadcasts a congestion message. The detection of the traffic congestion is confirmed only if
the vehicle receives a specific number of traffic congestion confirmations from the surrounding
vehicles. (ii) TAPC strategy’s Initiator Election Phase: After detecting the traffic congestion,
a first initiator of the strategy will be elected. If the vehicle did not receive any initiation
message from one of the surrounding vehicles and confirms the existence of traffic congestion,
it stops broadcasting safety messages for a random time, changes its pseudonym, broadcasts an
initiation message, and waits for a certain delay time. During this time, it stores each received
initiation message. In the end of this time, the vehicle checks if its position is the minimum
among the received positions. If so, the vehicle assigns itself as an initiator for the strategy.
(iii) Silent Mix Zone Creation Phase: Just after its election, the initiator stops broadcasting
safety messages, changes its pseudonym and starts broadcasting notifications, which contain the
position and the direction of the initiator and the threshold of speed below of which vehicles stop
broadcasting safety messages. If a vehicle receives such notification, it checks if it is situated in
the same direction behind the initiator and its speed is lower than the speed threshold included
in the notification, if so the vehicle then stops broadcasting safety messages and changes its
pseudonym during this time. (iv) Silent Mix Zone Extension Phase: The SM zone is extended
and a new initiator is elected before the SM zone gets filled. Indeed, each vehicle inside the SM
zone calculates the distance between itself and the initiator. If the distance roughly equals to
a fixed value the vehicle executes the initiator election phase as described in phase (ii). If the
new initiator is elected, the previous one stops broadcasting notifications as soon as receives
the first notification from the new initiator. and finally (v) End of Traffic Congestion Detection
Phase : The extension of the SM zone process continues until the end of the traffic congestion;
which is detected by the first initiator. Indeed, when its speed is still higher than the speed
threshold for a certain period of time, it then broadcasts the end of congestion message. This
message will be rebroadcasted by each elected initiator. If a vehicle receives this message, it
restarts broadcasting safety messages again.
3.3 Summary
In this section, we provide a summary to get an overview of the presented pseudonym changing
strategies. Table 1 summarizes characteristics and the methods used to evaluate the presented
strategies. The parameters of this summary are presented as follows:
• Category: indicates to which category the strategy belongs.
• Mode: indicates whether the strategy needs the infrastructure to work or not.
12
ar
X
iv
:
so
m
e
ot
h
er
te
x
t
go
es
h
er
e
• Radio Silence: indicates whether the strategy uses the radio silence or not.
• Encryp: indicates whether the strategy uses the encryption or not.
• Pseudo Exchang: indicates whether the strategy uses the exchanging of pseudonyms or
not.
• Evaluation Metric: indicates which metric is used to evaluate the level of the location
privacy protection achieved by the strategy. These metrics are described in Subsection 2.4
and abbreviated as follows:
– ASS: Anonymity Set Size.
– ASR: Adversary’s Success Rate.
– MTT: Maximum Tracking Time.
– DA: Degree of Anonymity.
– Statistics: Statistics on Pseudonym Changes.
• Evaluation Method: indicates which method is used to evaluate the level of the location
privacy protection achieved by the strategy.
Strategy
Category Mode Radio Encryp Pseudo Evaluation Evaluation
Silence Exchang Metric Method
CMIX [42]
Mix-zone-
based
Infrastructure-based No Yes No
Entropy
ASR
Simulation
CARAVAN/A-
MOEBA [36, 61]
Mix-cont
ext-based
Infrastructureless Yes No No
Entropy
MTT
Analy-model
Simulation
Mix-Context [54]
Mix-cont-
ext-based
Infrastructureless No No No MTT Simulation
SLOW [34]
Mix-cont
ext-based
Infrastructureless Yes No No ASR Simulation
DLP [56, 57]
Mix-cont
ext-based
Infrastructureless No No No ASR Analy-modekl
SocialSpots
[48, 49]
Mix-zone-
based
Infrastructure-based No No No ASS
Analy-model
Simulation
Mix-Context-
Enhanced [55]
Mix-cont
ext-based
Infrastructureless No No No Statistics Simulation
REP [68]
Mix-cont
ext-based
Infrastructureless No Yes No ASS Simulation
CPN [59]
Mix-cont
ext-based
Infrastructureless No No No ASS
Analy-model
Simulation
SlotSwap [69, 8]
Mix-context-
based
Infrastructureless No No Yes Entropy Simulation
DMLP [66, 67]
Mix-cont
ext-based
Infrastructure-based No Yes No Entropy Simulation
PCC [60]
Mix-cont
ext-based
Infrastructureless No No No
ASS
ASR
Simulation
SPCP [70]
Mix-cont
ext-based
Infrastructureless No No No
ASS
ASR
Simulation
UPCS [50, 51]
Mix-zone-
based
Infrastructure-based Yes No Yes Entropy
Analy-model
Simulation
TAPCS [71]
Mix-cont
ext-based
Infrastructureless Yes No No Entropy
Analy-model
Simulation
VLPZ-based
PCS [52, 72]
Mix-zone-
based
Infrastructure-based Yes No No
ASS
DA
Analy-model
Simulation
Table 1: A summary of pseudonym changing strategies.
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4 Comparison & Discussion
In this section, we discuss the effectiveness of pseudonym changing strategies. We based our
analyses on a strong passive adversary model, consisting of an External Global Passive Ad-
versary and an Internal Local Passive Adversary composed of few attackers. A realistic study
case of the assumed adversary model can be given as follows. Similarly to a mobile network,
a VANET infrastructure is envisioned to be managed by vehicular system operators. It could
exist for example a corrupt employee that works at an operator and has a full access to the
infrastructure administration system. Since this employee is able to capture each event occurs
in the VANET system, he can be considered as an external global passive adversary. Moreover,
this employee can collude with some VANET’s users (drivers) to help him in the tracking of
their targets. These users can then be considered as an internal local passive adversary. In
this discussion, we study the location privacy protection provided by the strategies against each
part of the adversary model (internal or external) separately.
By synchronizing pseudonym changing processes between vehicles, all strategies provide
some level of protection against the syntactic linking of pseudonyms attack. This level of
protection depends on the accuracy of the applied synchronization method and the number of
vehicles that involved in this process. After analyzing the strategies, we distinguished three
used synchronization methods. We could sort them according to their effectiveness against the
syntactic linking attack as follows:
1. GPS-based synchronization.
2. Infrastructure-based synchronization.
3. Protocol-based synchronization.
We argue that the strategies based on the GPS synchronization method are the most effective
against the syntactic linking attack, because they involve all vehicles. In addition, using the
GPS signals is considered among the most accurate time synchronization methods. Indeed, the
accuracy of GPS time signals is at the level of a few nanoseconds [73]. However, GPS signals
could be affected due to the bad weather and cannot be received in the tunnels, underground
passages, or near tall buildings [74]. The infrastructure-based method is the second more
effective synchronization method, because it involves a limited number of vehicles i.e. only
vehicles exist inside the zone controlled by the infrastructure. As the external adversary cannot
control the zone, it seems that all pseudonyms changes occur simultaneously. The protocol-based
synchronization method is less effective than the others, because it involves a limited number
of vehicles and it is not guaranteed if all the concerned vehicles will change their pseudonyms
or not.
Regards the protection against the semantic linking attack, we noticed that just few strate-
gies can provide protection against this attack. These strategies are based on hiding safety
messages information from the adversary for some period of time. To achieve this, two tech-
niques have been proposed: the encryption and the radio silence. However, each of these two
techniques has drawbacks. On the one hand, the encryption of safety messages is ineffective
against the internal passive adversary. Indeed, as this adversary has the privileges (creden-
tials) to decrypt safety messages, it can then provide a clue to the external adversary to read
the contents the safety messages. In addition, encrypting safety messages may not meet with
the requirements of VANETs and may introduce a communication overhead due to the mes-
sages used to share the encryption keys [42]. On the other hand, because no safety message is
broadcasting during the radio silence period, the use of this technique is challenging. Indeed,
the radio silence may affect the VANETs’ safety-related applications if it is not used properly
[75]. However, compared to the encryption technique, the radio silence provides an effective
protection against both internal and external passive adversaries, since no safety message is
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provided to the adversary during the radio silence. Therefore, we argue that the strategies that
based on the radio silence are more effective against the semantic linking attack compared to
the strategies that based on the encryption.
Besides this, the technique of the exchanging of pseudonyms was used in SlotSwap [8].
This technique is useful, because it limits the number of pseudonyms used by vehicles, which
has positive impacts on network performances and vehicles’ storage. However, exchanging
of pseudonyms without informing the authorities leads to losing the accountability/liability,
which is one of the primary security requirements for VANETs. In addition, the overhead may
be introduced, because of the huge number of messages that can be used in the exchange of
pseudonyms.
Strategy
Synchronization Semantic Syntactic Semantic
Method Protection Protection Protection
Technique Against Against
CMIX Infrastructure-based Encryption External only External only
CARAVAN/AMOEBA Protocol-based Radio silence Both Both
Mix-Context Protocol-based None Both None
SLOW Protocol-based Radio silence Both Both
DLP Protocol-Based None Both None
SocialSpots Infrastructure-based None Both None
Mix-ContextEnhanced Protocol-based None Both None
REP Protocol-based Encryption External only External only
CPN Protocol-based None Both None
SlotSwap GPS-based None Both None
DMLP Protocol-based Encryption External only External only
PCC Protocol-based None Both None
SPCP Protocol-based None Both None
UPCS Infrastructure-based Radio silence Both Both
TAPCS Protocol-based Radio silence Both Both
VLPZ-based PCS Infrastructure-based Radio silence Both Both
Table 2: A review of pseudonym changing strategies.
To summarize, Table 2 reviews pseudonym changing strategies based on the following pa-
rameters:
• Synchronization method: indicates which method is used to synchronize the pseudonyms
changes between vehicles.
• Semantic protection technique: indicates which technique is used to temporary hide
the safety message’s content from the adversary.
• Syntactic protection against: indicates against which type of adversary (internal/external),
the syntactic protection is provided. ”Both” stands for both of the two types.
• Semantic protection against: indicates against which type of adversary (internal/external),
the semantic protection is provided. ”Both” stands for both of the two types.
In Table 3, we compare pseudonym changing strategies. This comparison is based on two
axes:
1. The level of the pseudonyms linking prevention: this is measured by the ability of
the strategy to prevent the syntactic and the semantic linking attacks of pseudonyms. We
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Privacy Protection Costs
Strategy
Syntactic Semantic Impacts on Overhead Accountability
Linking Linking Safety loss
Protection Protection
CMIX + + No Yes No
CARAVAN/AMOEBA ++ ++ - - - No No
Mix-Context ++ No No No No
SLOW ++ ++ - - No No
DLP ++ No No No No
SocialSpots +++ No No No No
Mix-Context-Enhanced ++ No No No No
REP + + No Yes No
CPN ++ No No No No
SlotSwap ++++ No No Yes Yes
DMLP + + No Yes No
PCC ++ No No Yes No
SPCP ++ No No Yes No
UPCS +++ ++ - No No
TAPCS ++ ++ No No No
VLPZ-based PCS +++ ++ No No No
Table 3: A comparison between pseudonym changing strategies.
define four levels for the syntactic linking protection based on ”Synchronization method”
and ”Syntactic protection against” parameters (see Table 4). We also define two level for
the semantic linking protection based on ”Semantic protection against” parameter (see
Table 5).
2. The costs involved in the changing of the pseudonym: which comprise:
• Impacts on road safety: indicate whether the strategy has negative impacts on
road safety or no. Three levels of this parameter are defined.
• Overhead: this is expressed in terms of the additional messages that can be used by
the strategy to obtain the encryption keys or exchange the pseudonyms for example.
• Accountability Loss: indicates if the strategy leads to the loss of accountability
or not.
Syntactic Protection Syntactic Protection Synchronization Method
Level Against
+ External only *
++ Both Protocol-Based
+++ Both Infrastructure-based
++++ Both GPS-Based
Table 4: Syntactic protection levels.
5 Open research issues
Several parameters involves to build an effective pseudonym changing strategy. For example,
the simultaneous pseudonyms change of a large number of vehicles is required. In addition, the
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Semantic Protection level Semantic protection against
+ External only
++ Both
Table 5: Semantic protection levels.
use of the radio silence seems to be inevitable towards an effective strategy. However, although
considerable efforts have been made, several open issues are still needing more attention to
achieve the aimed strategy. Some of these issues are discussed in the following section.
5.1 Impact on road safety
As discussed in Section 4, the radio silence technique has proved its effectiveness to protect
against both external and internal passive adversaries. However, using this technique has nega-
tive impacts on safety-related applications [76]. In [75], Lefe`vre et al. studied the impact of the
radio-silence based pseudonym changing strategies on Intersection Collision Avoidance (ICA)
Systems. Their results highlight a positive correlation between the radio silence duration and
the impact on road safety. For example, their simulation results show, in case that the strategy
of pseudonym changing proposed by the SAE J2735 standard [77] is used, the radio silence
duration should be shorter that two seconds to ensure the well function of the considered ICA
application. For this reason, the authors proposed an adaptive pseudonym changing strategy
that compromises between privacy and safety. They conclude that the requirements of both
safety-related applications and pseudonym changing strategies should be taken into account in
the design of each of them.
In the last few years, several researchers start focusing on this issue. The existing works
can be divided into two categories. The works of the first category ( e.g. [78], [63], [64], [79],
[71]) suggest that vehicles continuously monitor its neighborhood to find a good opportunity
when the radio silence can be used. In the other hand, the works of the second category suggest
executing a radio-silence based strategy in places where the impact on road safety is low or null
such as signalized intersections [50] [51] and widespread roadside infrastructures [52, 72] (e.g.
gas stations, electric vehicles charging stations, and toll booths).
5.2 Non cooperative behavior
The cooperation between vehicles is a key factor on a successful pseudonym changing strategy.
However, due to the costs that involve in changing the pseudonym such as the overhead, and
the cost of changing and managing the pseudonym, vehicles may not want to cooperate with
other vehicles. The non-cooperative behavior in pseudonym changing strategy is first studied by
Freudiger et al. in [80]. The authors proposed a game-theoretic model that takes into account
the gained payoff and the cost generated by each vehicle while executing the strategy. They
demonstrated the existence of the Nash equilibria in both static and dynamic forms of the
game within complete and incomplete information. Based on the results of their analysis and
simulations, they proposed PseudoGame protocols for an optimal pseudonym changing. The
cooperation behavior is studied in [81] using the auction game model as well.
However, when we analyzed strategies we found that just few strategies take into account
the non cooperative behavior. Indeed, the authors in [49] relied on a simplified game-theoretic
to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed strategy assuming that all vehicles are rational.
The authors in [65, 67], studied the selfish behavior in the DMLP pseudonym changing strategy.
They proposed a reputation mechanism to stimulate selfish vehicles to cooperate by changing
their pseudonyms in a DMLP. The reputation value of a vehicle is increased each time it coop-
erates at other vehicle’s DMLP. The increase of reputation is computed based on the number of
cooperating vehicles at the ith DMLP. The accumulated reputation strength of a vehicle until
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the ith DMLP is used as a credit when a vehicle requests to create its own DMLP. Indeed, if
the accumulated reputation strength Ri is greater or equal to a certain threshold strength of
reputation ε, all vehicle that receive the COMMAND message will change their pseudonyms.
Else, the decision of a vehicle to cooperate or not depends to its current reputation R j , its
current location privacy level, the remaining lifetime of the current pseudonym (T). Indeed (i)
if R j is less than ε, a vehicle has to cooperate to increase its reputation value, (ii) if the location
privacy level is the less then recommended level γ the vehicle has to change its pseudonym as
well, and (iii) if the remaining life of the current pseudonym is close to (T), the vehicle will
change its pseudonym. Otherwise, the vehicle keep its pseudonym.
The authors in [72] also used a reputation based mechanism to motivate rational vehicles
to enter the VLPZ. Indeed, as the level of privacy protection mainly depends on the number
of vehicles inside the VLPZ at same time, the VLPZ always tries to increase its occupancy.
A vehicle is allowed to execute the strategy only if its reputation value is above or equal to a
certain threshold (ω) or it has not already refused an invitation form a VLPZ. Indeed, the VLPZ
occasionally sends invitations to vehicles to motivate them to enter to it. If a vehicle accepts to
enter, its reputation value will be increased. However, if a vehicle refuses, its reputation value
will be decreased. The following formulas gives the reputation value R
j
i of a given vehicle (vi)
after the j th invitation.
R
j
i =

R
j−1
i + |AS |tj if v cooperates
R
j−1
i − |AS |tj if v defeats and Rj−1i > |AS |tj
0 if v defeats and R
j−1
i < |AS |tj
Where R
j−1
i is the old reputation value of vi. The reputation value of the vehicle increases
as much as it cooperates. The increase or the decrease of the reputation value depends on the
VLPZ occupancy at tj , where the time tj is depended on the decision of vi.
5.3 Evaluation metrics and techniques
Due to the abstract nature of privacy concept, quantifying the privacy protection level is difficult
task to perform. A variety of metrics (e.g. [35][82][83][84][85]) and techniques (e.g.[86][87][88][89][90])
have been proposed to evaluate the achieved level of location privacy protection in VANETs.
However, finding an unified framework and a comprehensible metric to evaluate and compare
pseudonym changing strategies is not yet achieved.
Three initiatives have recently been emerged to propose a simulation framework to evalu-
ate the privacy level in VANETs. Tomandl et al. [88] proposed VANETsim an event-driven
simulation framework that allows implementing a set of pseudonym changing strategies in an
abstract way i.e. without considering the wireless medium characteristics and communication
protocols used in VANETs. In [87], Eckhoff et al. described a generic design of Veins simulation
framework extension devoted to evaluate the pseudonym changing strategies. This extension
consists of three main blocks (i) the attacker model block, (ii) the metrics block, and (iii) the
scenarios block. This extension is concertized by Emara in [91]. Indeed, the authors proposed
PREXT (Privacy Extension for Veins VANET Simulator). PREXT adopts the attacker model
proposed in [82], uses most popular privacy metrics and implements seven pseudonym changing
strategies.
From a macroscopic view, these efforts seem encouraging. However, with more focus, we
believe that more efforts should to be done to evaluate the proposed privacy mechanisms. In
particular, the used privacy metrics are general and do not take the context of VANETs into
account. We think that the difficulty of the problem is mainly related to the definition of privacy
in the context of VANETs.
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6 Conclusion
The pseudonym changing strategy of is an important building block of the pseudonym changing
approach. All efforts should be made in order to achieve the aimed strategy before the real-word
deployment of the pseudonym changing mechanism. In this survey paper, we surveyed relevant
pseudonym changing strategies for VANETs and classified them into two categories. We also
identified the strengths and costs generated by the presented strategies. Finally, we highlighted
some challenges on the pseudonym changing strategy issue.
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